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Abstract
A first-order conditional logic is considered, with se-
mantics given by a variant of ǫ-semantics (Adams 1975;
Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992), where ϕ→ψ means that Pr(ψ |
ϕ) approaches 1 super-polynomially—faster than any inverse
polynomial. This type of convergence is needed for reason-
ing about security protocols. A complete axiomatization is
provided for this semantics, and it is shown how a qualita-
tive proof of the correctness of a security protocol can be au-
tomatically converted to a quantitative proof appropriate for
reasoning about concrete security.
1 Introduction
Security protocols, such as key-exchange and key-
management protocols, are short, but notoriously
difficult to prove correct. Flaws have been found
in numerous protocols, ranging from the the 802.11
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) protocol used to pro-
tect link-layer communications from eavesdropping
and other attacks (Borisov, Goldberg, & Wagner 2001)
to standards and proposed standards for Se-
cure Socket Layer (Wagner & Schneier 1996;
Mitchell, Shmatikov, & Stern 1998) to Kerberos
(Bella & Paulson 1998). Not surprisingly, a great deal
of effort has been devoted to proving the correctness of
such protocols. There are two largely disjoint approaches.
The first essentially ignores the details of cryptography
by assuming perfect cryptography (i.e., nothing encrypted
can ever be decrypted without the encryption key) and
an adversary that controls the network. By ignoring the
cryptography, it is possible to give a more qualitative proof
of correctness, using logics designed for reasoning about
security protocols. Indeed, this approach has enabled
axiomatic proofs of correctness and model checking of
proofs (see, for example, (Mitchell, Mitchell, & Stern 1997;
Paulson 1994)). The second approach applies the tools
of modern cryptography to proving correctness, using
more quantitative arguments. Typically it is shown
that, given some security parameter k (where k may be,
for example, the length of the key used) an adversary
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whose running time is polynomial in k has a negligible
probability of breaking the security, where “negligible”
means “less than any inverse polynomial function of k”
(see, for example, (Bellare, Canetti, & Krawczyk 1998;
Goldreich 2001)).
There has been recent work on bridging the gap between
these two approaches, with the goal of constructing a logic
that can allow reasoning about quantitative aspects of secu-
rity protocols while still being amenable to mechanization.
This line of research started with the work of Abadi and
Rogaway 2000. More recently, Datta et al. 2005 showed
that by giving a somewhat nonstandard semantics to their
first-order Protocol Composition Logic (Datta et al. 2007),
it was possible to reason about many features of the com-
putational model. In this logic, an “implication” of the
form ϕ ⊃ B is interpreted as, roughly speaking, the prob-
ability of B given ϕ is high. For example, a statement
like secret encrypted ⊃ adversary does not
decrypt the secret says “with high probability, if
the secret is encrypted, the adversary does not decrypt it”.
While the need for such statements should be clear, the prob-
abilistic interpretation used is somewhat unnatural, and no
axiomatization is provided by Datta et al. 2005 for the ⊃
operator (although some sound axioms are given that use it).
The interpretation of ⊃ is quite reminiscent of one
of the interpretations of → in conditional logic, where
ϕ → ψ can be interpreted as “typically, if ϕ then
ψ” (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990). Indeed, one se-
mantics given to →, called ǫ-semantics (Adams 1975;
Goldszmidt & Pearl 1992), is very close in spirit to that used
in (Datta et al. 2005); this is particularly true for the for-
mulation of ǫ-semantics given by Goldszmidt, Morris, and
Pearl 1993. In this formulation, a formula ϕ → ψ is eval-
uated with respect to a sequence (Pr1,Pr2, . . .) of proba-
bility measures (probability sequence, for short): it is true
if, roughly speaking, limn→∞ Prn(ψ | ϕ) = 1 (where
Prk(ψ | ϕ) is taken to be 1 if Prk(ϕ) = 1). This formula-
tion is not quite strong enough for some security-related pur-
poses, where the standard is super-polynomial convergence,
that is, convergence faster than any inverse polynomial. To
capture such convergence, we can take ϕ → ψ to be true
with respect to this probability sequence if, for all polynomi-
als p, there exists n∗ such that, for all n ≥ n∗, Prn(ψ | ϕ) ≥
1 − 1/p(n). (Note that this implies that limn→∞ Prn(ψ |
ϕ) = 1.) In a companion paper, it is shown that reinterpret-
ing → in this way gives an elegant, powerful variant of the
logic considered in (Datta et al. 2005), which can be used to
reason about security protocols of interest.
While it is already a pleasant surprise that conditional
logic provides such a clean approach to reasoning about se-
curity, using conditional logic has two further significant ad-
vantages, which are the subject of this paper. The first is that,
as I show here, the well-known complete axiomatization of
conditional logic with respect to ǫ-semantics continues to be
sound and complete with respect to the super-polynomial se-
mantics for →; thus, the axioms form a basis for automated
proofs. The second is that the use of conditional logic al-
lows for a clean transition from qualitative to quantitative
arguments. To explain these points, I need to briefly recall
some well-known results from the literature.
As is well known, the KLM properties
(Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990) (see Section 2) provide
a sound and complete axiomatization for reasoning about
→ formulas with respect to ǫ-semantics (Geffner 1992).
More precisely, if ∆ is a collection of formulas of the form
ϕ′ → ψ′, then ∆ (ǫ-)entails ϕ → ψ (that is, for every
probability sequence P , if every formula in ∆ is true in P
according to ǫ semantics, then so is ϕ → ψ), then ϕ → ψ
is provable from ∆ using the KLM properties. This result
applies only when ∆ is a collection of → formulas. ∆
cannot include negations or disjunctions of → formulas.
Conditional logic extends the KLM framework by allowing
Boolean combinations of → statements. A sound and com-
plete axiomatization of propositional conditional logic with
semantics given by what are called preferential structures
was given by Burgess 1981; Friedman and Halpern 2001
proved it was also sound and complete for ǫ-semantics.
Propositional conditional logic does not suffice for rea-
soning about security. The logic of (Datta et al. 2005) is
first-order; quantification is needed to capture important
properties of security protocols. A sound and complete ax-
iomatization for the language of first-order conditional logic,
denoted ŁC , with respect to ǫ-semantics is given by Fried-
man, Halpern, and Koller 2000. The first major result of
this paper shows a conditional logic formula ϕ is satisfiable
in some model M with respect to ǫ-semantics iff it is satisfi-
able in some modelM ′ with respect to the super-polynomial
semantics. It follows that all the completeness results for
ǫ-semantics apply without change to the super-polynomial
semantics.
I then consider the language Ł0C which essentially con-
sists of universal → formulas, that is, formulas of the form
∀x1 . . .∀xn(ϕ→ψ), whereϕ and ψ are first-order formulas.
As in the KLM framework, there are no nested → formulas
or negated → formulas. The second major result of this pa-
per is to provide a sound and complete axiomatization that
extends the KLM properties for reasoning abut when a col-
lection of formulas in Ł0C entails a formula in Ł0C .
It might seem strange to be interested in an axiomatization
for Ł0C when there is already a sound and complete axiom-
atization for the full language ŁC . However, Ł0C has some
significant advantages. In reasoning about concrete secu-
rity, asymptotic complexity results do not suffice; more de-
tailed information about security guarantees is needed. For
example, we may want to prove that an SSL server that sup-
ports 1,000,000 sessions using 1024 bit keys has a proba-
bility of 0.999999 of providing the desired service without
being compromised. I show how to convert a qualitative
proof of security in the language Ł0C , which provides only
asymptotic guarantees, to a quantitative proof. Moreover,
the conversion shows exactly how strong the assumptions
have to be in order to get the desired 0.999999 level of secu-
rity. Such a conversion is not posisble with ŁC .
This conversion justifies reasoning at the qualitative level.
A qualitative proof can be constructed without worrying
about the details of the numbers, and then automatically con-
verted to a quantitative proof for the desired level of security.
In the next section, I review the syntax and semantics
of conditional logic, with an emphasis on ǫ semantics,
and show how it can be modified to deal with the super-
polynomial convergence that is more appropriate for reason-
ing about security. In Section 3, I provide axioms and infer-
ence rules for both qualitative and quantitative reasoning.
2 First-Order Conditional Logic
I review the syntax and semantics of first-order conditional
logic here. Although I focus on first-order conditional logic
here, it is straightforward to specialize all the definitions
and results to the propositional case, so I do not discuss the
propositional case further.
The syntax of first-order conditional logic is straightfor-
ward. Fix a finite first-order vocabulary T consisting, as
usual, of function symbols, predicate symbols, and con-
stants. Starting with atomic formulas of first-order logic
over the vocabulary T , more complicated formulas are
formed by closing off under the standard truth-functional
connectives (i.e., ∧ ,∨, ¬, and ⇒), first-order quantification,
and the binary modal operator→. Thus, a typical formula is
∀x(P (x)→∃y(Q(x, y)→R(y))). Let ŁC(T ) be the result-
ing language. Let Łfo(T ) be the pure first-order fragment of
ŁC(T ), consisting of →-free formluas. Let Ł0C(T ) consist
of all formulas in ŁC(T ) of the form ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ→ψ),
where ϕ and ψ are in Łfo . (I henceforth omit the T unless it
is necessary for clarity.) Note that Ł0C does not include nega-
tions of → formulas or conjunctions of → formulas. While
not having conjunctions does not really impair the expres-
sive power of Ł0C (since we will be interested in sets of Ł0C
formulas, where a set can be identified with the conjunction
of the formulas in the set), the lack of negation does.
I give two semantics to formulas in ŁC(T ). In both se-
mantics, the truth of formulas is defined with respect to PS
structures. A PS structure is a tuple M = (D,W, π,P),
where D is a domain, W is a set of worlds, π is an interpre-
tation, which associates with each predicate symbol (resp.,
function symbol, constant symbol) in T and world w ∈W a
predicate (resp., function, domain element) of the right arity,
and P = 〈Pr1,Pr2, . . .〉 is a probability sequence. As usual,
a valuation V associates with each variable x an element
V (x) ∈ D.
Given a valuation V and structure M , the semantics of
∧, ¬, ⇒, and ∀ is completely standard. In particular, the
truth of a first-order formula in Łfo in a world w, written
(M,V,w) |= ϕ, is determined as usual. For ϕ ∈ Łfo , let
[[ϕ]]M,V = {w : (M,V,w) |= ϕ}. If ϕ is a closed formula,
so that its truth does not depend on the valuation, I occasion-
ally write [[ϕ]]M rather than [[ϕ]]M,V . I write (M,V ) |= ϕ if
(M,V,w) |= ϕ for all worlds w. The truth of an → formula
does not depend on the world, but only on the structure M .
(M,V ) |= ϕ→ψ if lim
n→∞
Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) = 1,
where Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) is taken to be 1 if
Prn([[ϕ]]M,V ) = 0.
I also consider an alternative semantics that gives super-
polynomial convergence. A polynomial is positive if all its
coefficients are nonnegative and at least one is nonzero.
(M,V ) |= sp ϕ→ψ if for all positive polynomials p,
there exists some n∗ ≥ 0 such that, for all n ≥ n∗,
Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1− (1/p(n)).
As usual, I writeM |= ϕ if (M,V ) |= ϕ for all valuations
V , and M |= ϕ if M |= ϕ for all PS structures in a set M,
and similarly with |= replaced by |= sp .
3 Axioms for qualitative and quantitative
reasoning
In this section, I start by showing that qualitative reason-
ing for both |= and |= sp is characterized by the same ax-
iom system. I then provide a complete axiomatization for
Ł0C . Finally, I consider quantitative conditional logic. In
the axioms, it is convenient to use Nϕ as an abbreviation
for ¬ϕ→false. Note that if ϕ is a closed formula, then
M |= Nϕ iff, for some n∗, Prn([[ϕ]]M ) = 0 for all n ≥ n∗,
and similarly with |= replaced by |= sp . Thus, Nϕ can be
read as saying “ϕ is almost surely true”.
3.1 Qualitative Reasoning
As was mentioned in the introduction, Friedman, Halpern,
and Koller 2000 provide a complete axiomatization AXC
for ŁC with respect to |=. For the security applications, a
generalization of their result is needed, where it is possible to
restrict to models where all worlds satisfy a particular first-
order theory Λ. Let ⊢Λ denote provability in first-order logic
given the axioms in the theory Λ. Let AXΛC consist of the
following axioms and rules:
Λ-AX. ϕ, if ϕ ∈ Łfo and ⊢Λ ϕ.
C0. All substitution instances of propositional tautologies.
C1. ϕ→ϕ.
C2. ((ϕ→ψ1) ∧ (ϕ→ψ2))⇒ (ϕ→(ψ1 ∧ ψ2)).
C3. ((ϕ1→ψ) ∧ (ϕ2→ψ))⇒ ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2)→ψ).
C4. ((ϕ1→ϕ2) ∧ (ϕ1→ψ))⇒ ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2)→ψ).
C5. [(ϕ→ψ)⇒ N(ϕ→ψ)] ∧ [¬(ϕ→ψ)⇒ N¬(ϕ→ψ)].
C6. ¬(true→false).
F1. ∀xϕ ⇒ ϕ[x/t], where t is substitutable for x in
the sense discussed below and ϕ[x/t] is the result of
substituting t for all free occurrences of x in ϕ (see
(Enderton 1972) for a formal definition).
F2. ∀x(ϕ⇒ ψ)⇒ (∀xϕ⇒ ∀xψ).
F3. ϕ⇒ ∀xϕ if x does not occur free in ϕ.
F4. x = y ⇒ (ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2), where ϕ1 is quantifier-free and
ϕ2 is obtained from ϕ1 by replacing zero or more occur-
rences of x in ϕ1 by y.
F5. x 6= y ⇒ N(x 6= y).
MP. From ϕ and ϕ⇒ ψ infer ψ.
Gen. From ϕ infer ∀xϕ.
R1. From ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2 infer ϕ1→ψ ⇔ ϕ2→ψ.
R2. From ψ1 ⇒ ψ2 infer ϕ→ψ1 ⇒ ϕ→ψ2.
The axiom system AXC of
(Friedman, Halpern, & Koller 2000) does not have Λ-
AX (this is needed to incorporate the theory Λ) and
includes an axiom x = x that follows from Λ-AX; oth-
erwise, the axiom systems are identical. As observed in
(Friedman, Halpern, & Koller 2000), the “positive” version
of F5, x = y ⇒ N(x = y), is also sound. It is not included
in the axiomatization because it is provable from the other
axioms.
It remains to explain the notion of “substitutable” in F1.
Clearly a term t with free variables that might be captured
by some quantifiers in ϕ cannot be substituted for x; for ex-
ample, while ∀x∃y(x 6= y) is true as long as the domain
has at least two elements, the result of substituting y for x is
∃y(y 6= y), which is surely false. In the case of first-order
logic, it suffices to define “substitutable” so as to make sure
this does not happen (see (Enderton 1972) for details). How-
ever, in modal logics such as this one, more care must be
taken In general, terms cannot be substituted for universally
quantified variables in a modal context, since terms are not
in general rigid; that is, they can have different interpreta-
tions in different worlds. To understand the impact of this,
consider the formula ∀x(¬NP (x)) ⇒ ¬NP (c) (where P
is a unary predicate and c is a constant). This formula is not
valid in PS structures. For example, consider a PS structure
with two worldsw1 andw2, and a domain with two elements
d1 and d2. Suppose that in world w1, P (d1) holds, P (d2)
does not, and c is interpreted as d1, while in worldw2, P (d2)
holds, P (d1) does not, and c is interpreted as d2. Then it is
easy to see that NP (c) holds in both worlds, but NP (x)
holds in only one world, no matter how x is interpreted. If
Prn(w1) = Prn(w2) = 1/2 for all n, then M |= NP (c),
while M |= ∀x(¬NP (x)). Thus, if ϕ is a formula that has
occurrences of →, then the only terms that are considered
substitutable for x in ϕ are other variables.
It is interesting to contrast R1, R2, and C4. While R2
allows a formula ψ1 on the right-hand side of → to be re-
placed by a weaker formula ψ2 (that is, a formula such that
that ψ1 ⇒ ψ2 is provable), R1 just allows a formula ϕ1
on the left-hand side of → to be replaced by an equivalent
formulaϕ2, rather than a stronger formula. C4 allows the re-
placement of a formulaϕ1 on the left-hand side by a stronger
formula, ϕ1∧ϕ2, but only if ϕ1→ϕ2 holds. Intuitively, this
says that if ϕ2 and ψ each almost always hold given ϕ1, then
ψ almost always holds given both ϕ1 and ϕ2. Monotonicity
does not hold in general. That is, if if ϕ1 ⇒ ϕ2 is prov-
able and ϕ2→ψ holds, then ϕ1→ψ does not necessarily
hold. For a simple counterexample, it is not the case that if
true→ψ holds then ¬ψ→ψ holds. If ψ(x) states that x can-
not break the encryption, it seems reasonable to expect that,
almost always, x cannot break the encryption (true→ψ(x)),
but it surely is not the case that x cannot break the encryp-
tion given that x can break it.
The remaining axioms and rules are easy to explain. In
particular, C2 says that if both ψ1 and ψ2 almost always hold
given ϕ, then so does ψ1 ∧ ψ2, while C3 allows reasoning
by cases: if ψ almost always holds given each of ϕ1 and ϕ2,
then it almost always holds given their disjunction.
I want to show that AXΛC is also sound and complete for
the |= sp semantics. The key step in doing that is to show
that a formula is satisfiable with respect to the |= semantics
iff it is satisfiable with respect to the |= sp semantics.
Theorem 3.1: If M = (D,W, π,P) is a PS structure
and D is countable, then there exists a probability se-
quence P ′ such that, for all valuations V , (M,V ) |= ϕ iff
(M ′, V ) |= sp ϕ, where M ′ = (D,W, π,P ′).
Proof: Suppose that M = (D,W, π,P), where D =
{d1, d2, . . .} (D may be finite), and P = (Pr1,Pr2, . . .).
Let L = (ϕ1→ψ1, ϕ2→ψ2, . . .) be a list of all formu-
las of the form ϕ′→ψ′ in ŁC with the property that if
(M,V ′) |= ¬(ϕ′→ψ′) for some valuation V ′, then ϕ′→ψ′
appears infinitely often in L. Suppose that the set of vari-
ables is {x1, x2, . . .}. (I am implicitly assuming that the
set of variables is countable, as is standard.) Let Vn be
the set of valuations V such that V (xi) ∈ {d1, . . . , dn} for
i = 1, . . . , n and V (xm) = d1 for all m > n. Given a
valuation V ′ and a formula ϕ ∈ ŁC , there exists n such
that, for all free variables x in ϕ, x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn} and
V ′(x) ∈ {d1, . . . , dn}. Thus, (M,V ′) |= ϕ for some val-
uation V ′ iff (M,V ′) |= ϕ for some valuation V ′ ∈ Vn.
Suppose that the elements of Vn are V n1 , . . . , V n|Vn|.
Since Vn is finite, there is a subsequence P ′ =
(Pr′11, . . .Pr1|V1|,Pr
′
21, . . . ,Pr2|V2|, . . .) of P with the fol-
lowing properties, for 1 ≤ m ≤ |Vn|:
for all j ≤ n and V ′ ∈ Vn, if (M,V ′) |= ϕj→ψj ,
then Pr′nm([[ψj ]]M,V ′ | [[ϕj ]]M,V ′) ≥ 1− 1/nn;
(1)
if (M,V nm) |= ¬(ϕn→ψn), then
Pr′nm([[ψn]]M,V nm | [[ϕn]]M,V nm) < 1− 1/k, where k
is the smallest integer such that, for infinitely many
indices h, Prh([[ψn]]M,V n
m
| [[ϕn]]M,V n
m
) < 1− 1/k.
(2)
(There must be such a k, since limh→∞ Prh([[ψn]]M,V n
m
|
[[ϕn]]M,V n
m
) 6= 1.)
Let M ′−(D,W, π,P ′). I now prove that (M,V ) |= ϕ iff
(M ′, V ) |= sp ϕ for all valuations V and formulas ϕ ∈ ŁC
by a straightforward induction on the structure of ϕ. If ϕ is
an atomic formula, this is immediate, since M and M ′ dif-
fer only in their probability sequences. All cases but the one
where ϕ has the form ϕ′→ψ′ follow immediately from the
induction hypothesis. If ϕ has the form ϕ′→ψ′, first sup-
pose that (M,V ) |= ϕ′→ψ′. Fix a polynomial p. There
must exist some n∗ such that (a) for all free variables x in
ϕ′ or ψ′, x ∈ {x1, . . . , xn∗} and V (x) ∈ {d1, . . . dn∗}, (b)
p(n) < 1/nn for all n ≥ n∗, and (c) ϕ′→ψ′ is among
the first n∗ formulas in L. It follows from (a) that for
all n ≥ n∗, there exists some V ′ ∈ VN such that V ′
and V agree on all the free variables in ϕ′→ψ′. It then
follows from (b), (c), and (1) that, for all n ≥ n∗ and
1 ≤ m ≤ |Vn|, Pr
′
nm([[ψ
′]]M,V | [[ϕ′]]M,V ) ≥ 1 − 1/p(n).
Thus, (M,V ) |= sp ϕ′→ψ′.
If (M,V ) |= ¬(ϕ′→ψ′), there must be some minimal
k such that Prh([[ψ′]]M,V | [[ϕ′]]M,V ) < 1 − 1/k for in-
finitely many indices h. Since ϕ′→ψ′ occurs infinitely of-
ten in L, it easily follows from (2) that, for infinitely many
values of n and h, Pr′nh([[ψ′]]M,V | [[ϕ′]]M,V ) < 1 − 1/k.
Let p(n) = k (so p(n) is a constant function). It follows
that Pr′nh([[ψ′]]M,V | [[ϕ′]]M,V ) < 1 − 1/p(n) for infinitely
many values of n and h. Thus, (M,V ) |= sp ¬(ϕ′→ψ′).
This completes the proof.
Let PS(Λ) consist of all PS structures M where every
world satisfies Λ.
Theorem 3.2: AXΛC is a sound and complete axiomatizationfor PS(Λ) with respect to both |= and |= sp . That is, the
following are equivalent for all formulas in ŁC(T ):
(a) AXΛC ⊢ ϕ;
(b) PS(Λ) |= ϕ;
(c) PS(Λ) |= sp ϕ.
Proof: The equivalence of parts (a) and (b) for the
case that Λ = ∅ is proved in Theorem 5.2 of
(Friedman, Halpern, & Koller 2000). The same proof shows
that the result holds for arbitrary Λ. To show that (a) implies
(c), I must show that all the axioms are sound. The sound-
ness of all the axioms and rules other than C2, C3, C4, and
C5 is trivial. I consider each of these axioms in turn.
For C2, suppose that M = (D,W, π, 〈Pr1,Pr2, . . .〉) is a
PS structure such that M |= sp ϕ→ψ1 and M |= sp ϕ→ψ2.
Since M |= sp ϕ→ψi, i = 1, 2, given a positive polyno-
mial p, there exists n∗1, n∗2 ≥ 0 such that, for all n ≥ n∗i ,
Prn([[ψi]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1 − 1/2p(n), for i = 1, 2. For
all n ≥ max(n∗1, n∗2), Prn([[ψi]] | [[ϕ]]) ≤ 1/2p(n). Thus,
for n ≥ max(n∗1, n∗2),
Prn([[ψ1 ∧ ψ2]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V )
≥ 1− (Prn([[ψ1]] | [[ϕ]]) + Prn([[ψ2]] | [[ϕ]]))
≥ 1− 12p(n) −
1
2p(n)
= 1− 1
p(n) .
For C3, note that
Pr(A | B1 ∪B2)
= Pr((A ∩B1 ∪ A ∩B2) | B1 ∪B2)
= Pr(A ∩B1 | B1 ∪B2) + Pr(A ∩B2 | B1 ∪B2)
−Pr(A ∩B1 ∩B2 | B1 ∪B2)
= Pr(A | B1)× Pr(B1 | B1 ∪B2)
+Pr(A | B2)× Pr(B2 | B1 ∪B2)
−Pr(A ∩B1 ∩B2 | B1 ∪B2).
(3)
Now suppose that M |= sp ϕ1→ψ and M |= sp ϕ2→ψ.
Given a positive polynomial p, as in the case of C2, there
exist n∗1 and n∗2 such that, for all n ≥ n∗i , Prn([[ψ]]M,V |
[[ϕ1]]M,V ) ≥ 1 − 1/2p(n), for i = 1, 2. It easily follows
from (3) that if n ≥ max(n∗1, n∗2), then
Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
≥ (1− 12p(n) )Prn([[ϕ1]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
+(1− 12p(n) )Prn([[ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
−Prn([[ψ ∧ ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
≥ (1− 12p(n) )Prn([[ϕ1]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
+(1− 12p(n) )Prn([[ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
−Prn([[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
≥ (1− 12p(n) )[Prn([[ϕ1]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
+Prn([[ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
−Prn([[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )]
− 12p(n)Prn([[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]]M,V | [[ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2]]M,V )
≥ (1− 12p(n) )−
1
2p(n)
= 1− 1
p(n) .
For C4, note that
Pr(A1 | A2 ∩B)
= Pr(A1 ∩ A2 | B)/Pr(A2 | B) ≥ Pr(A2 ∩ A2 | B),
so the argument follows essentially the same lines as that for
C2.
Finally, C5 follows easily from the fact that the truth of
a formula of the form ϕ→ψ or ¬(ϕ→ψ) is independent of
the world, and depends only on the probability sequence.
Finally, I must show that (c) implies (b). Suppose not.
Then there exists a formula ϕ such that PS(Λ) |= sp
ϕ but PS(Λ)6 |=ϕ. Thus, there exists M ∈ PS(Λ)
and valuation V such that (M,V )6 |=ϕ. The proof in
(Friedman, Halpern, & Koller 2000) shows that if a formula
is satisfiable with respect to |= at all, then it is satisfiable in a
structure in PS(Λ) with a countable domain. Thus, without
loss of generality, M has a countable domain. But then it
immediately follows from Theorem 3.1 that PS(Λ)6 |= spϕ.
I next completely characterize reasoning in Ł0C . I start by
considering the fragment Ł−C of Ł
0
C consisting of all formu-
las of the form ϕ→ψ where ϕ and ψ are closed first-order
formulas. Thus, Ł−C does not allow → formulas to be uni-
versally quantified. Consider the following rules:
LLE. If ⊢Λ ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2, then from ϕ1→ψ infer ϕ2→ψ (left
logical equivalence).
RW. If ⊢Λ ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, then from ϕ→ψ1 infer ϕ→ψ2 (right
weakening).
REF. ϕ→ϕ (reflexivity).
AND. From ϕ→ψ1 and ϕ→ψ2 infer ϕ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2.
OR. From ϕ1→ψ and ϕ2→ψ infer ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2→ψ.
CM. From ϕ1→ϕ2 and ϕ1→ψ infer ϕ∧ϕ2→ψ (cautious
monotonicity).
This collection of rules has been called system PΛ
(Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990) or the KLM properties1
1Λ is not usually mentioned explicitly, but it will be useful to
do so for the results of this paper.
The rules are obvious analogues of axioms in AXΛC . In par-
ticular, LLE is the analogue of R1, RW is the analogue of
R2, REF is the analogue C1, AND is the analogue of C2, OR
is the analogue of C3, and CM is the analogue of C4. Given
a collection ∆ of → formulas, I write PΛ ⊢ ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ if
ϕ→ψ can be derived from ∆ using these rules. A deriva-
tion from ∆ consists of a sequence of steps of the form
∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ, where either (a) ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆, (b) ϕ = ψ
(which can be viewed as an application of the axiom REF),
or (c) ϕ→ψ follows from previous steps by application of
one of the rules in PΛ. All the rules above have the form
“from ϕ1 → ψ1, . . . ϕn → ψi’ infer ϕ → ψ”; this can
be viewed as an abbreviation for the rule scheme “from
∆ →֒ ϕ1→ψi, . . .∆ →֒ ϕn→ψn infer ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ”, with
the same ∆ everywhere. Although, for all these rules, the set
∆ is the same everywhere, later there will be rules where dif-
ferent sets ∆ are involved. I write (M,V ) |= ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ
if (M,V ) |= ϕ′→ψ′ for every formula ϕ′→ψ′ ∈ ∆ im-
plies that (M,V ) |= ϕ→ψ. (For a formula ϕ→ψ ∈ Ł−C , ϕ
and ψ are closed, so (M,V ) |= ϕ→ψ iff M |= ϕ→ψ.
However, in Ł0C there are open formulas, so the valua-
tion V plays a role.) I write PS(Λ) |= ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ if
(M,V ) |= ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ for all PS structures M and valua-
tions V . As usual, a rule is said to be sound if it preserves
truth (in this case, with respect to all (M,V )); that is, if all
the antecedents hold with respect to (M,V ), then so does
the conclusion.
The following result is well known.
Theorem 3.3 : (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor 1990;
Geffner 1992) If ∆ ∪ {ϕ→ψ} ⊆ Ł−C , then
PΛ ⊢ ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ iff PS(Λ) |= ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ.
I want to extend this result from Ł−C to Ł
0
C , and to the
|= sp semantics as well as the |= semantics, so as to make it
applicable to reasoning about security protocols. I actually
extend it to Ł0C∪Łfo . A collection∆ of formulas in Ł0C∪Łfo
can be written as ∆→ ∪∆fo , where ∆→ ⊆ Ł0C and ∆fo ⊆
Łfo . Consider the following strengthening of LLE:
LLE+. If ⊢Λ∪∆fo ϕ ⇔ ψ, then from ∆ →֒ ϕ1→ψ infer
∆ →֒ ϕ2→ψ.
RW can be similarly strengthened to RW+.
Some rules from AXΛC to deal with the universal quantifi-
cation are also needed, specifically, variants of Λ-AX, F1,
and F3, and another rule similar in spirit to F3:
Λ-AX+. If ⊢Λ∪∆fo ϕ, then ∆ →֒ ϕ.
F1+. From ∀xϕ inferϕ[x/z], where z is a variable that does
not appear in ϕ.
F3+. If x does not appear free in ∆, then from∆ →֒ ϕ infer
∆ →֒ ∀xϕ.
EQ. If x does not appear free in ∆, ϕ, or ψ, and σ is a
first-order formula, then from ∆ ∪ {σ} →֒ ϕ infer ∆ ∪
{∃xσ} →֒ ϕ (existential quantification).
REN. If y1, . . . , yn do not appear in ϕ, then from
∀x1, . . . , xnϕ infer ∀y1, . . . , yn(ϕ[x1/y1, . . . , xn/yn])
(renaming).
But these rules do not seem to suffice. Intuitively, what
is needed is a way to capture the fact that the domain is the
same in all worlds In AXΛC , the one axiom that captures this
is F5. Unfortunately, F5 is not expressible in Ł0C . To capture
its effects in Ł0C , a somewhat more complicated rule seems
necessary.
Definition 3.4: An interpretation-independent formula ϕ
is a first-order formula that does not mention any constant,
function, or predicate symbols (and, thus, is a formula whose
atomic predicates all are of the form x = y).
The following rule can be viewed as a variant of the OR rule
for interpretation-independent formulas.
II. If ∆ ∪ {σ1} →֒ ϕ, ∆ ∪ {σ2} →֒ ϕ, and σ1 and σ2
are interpretation-independent, then ∆ ∪ {σ1 ∨ σ2} →֒ ϕ
(interpretation independence).
Let P+Λ consist of PΛ (with LLE and RW replaced by
LLE+ and RW+, respectively) together with F1+, F3+, EQ,
REN, and II.
Theorem 3.5: If ∆ ∪ {ϕ} ⊆ Ł0C ∪ Łfo , then the following
are equivalent:
(a) P+Λ ⊢ ∆ →֒ ϕ;
(b) PS(Λ) |= ∆ →֒ ϕ;
(c) PS(Λ) |= sp ∆ →֒ ϕ.
Proof: The argument for soundness (that is, that (a) implies
(c)) for the axioms and rules that also appear in PΛ is es-
sentially done in the proof of Theorem 3.2; the soundness
of F1+, F3+, EQ, and REN is straightforward. The sound-
ness of II follows easily from the observation that, since
there is a fixed domain, if σ1 and σ2 are interpretation in-
dependent and (M,V ) |= σ2 ∨ σ2, then (M,V ) |= σ1 or
(M,V ) |= σ2. This would not be the case for a formula
such as d1 = d2 ∨ d1 = d3. It could be that, for every
world w, (M,V,w) |= d1 = d2 ∨ d1 = d3, with either
d1 = d2 being true in every world or d1 = d3 being true in
every world.
The fact that (c) implies (b) follows just as in the proof of
Theorem 3.2, using Theorem 3.1. Thus, it remains to show
that (b) implies (a). As usual, for completeness, it suf-
fices to show that if P+Λ 6 ⊢∆ →֒ ∀x1 . . .∀xn(ϕ→ψ), then
there is a structure M ∈ PS(Λ) and valuation V such that
M |= ∆ and (M,V ) |= ¬∀x1 . . .∀xn(ϕ→ψ). The idea
is to reduce to Theorem 3.3 by transforming to a situation
where the rules in PΛ suffice. Let Distk be the formula that
says that there are at least k distinct domain elements;
∃x1 . . . ∃xk(∧1≤i<j≤kxi 6= xj).
Note that Distk is interpretation-independent. Let ∆0 = ∆;
let ∆n+1 = ∆n ∪ {Distn+1} if P+Λ 6 ⊢∆n ∪ {Distn+1} →֒
ϕ→ψ and let ∆n+1 = ∆n∪{¬Distn+1} otherwise; finally,
let ∆∞ = ∪n∆n.
An easy induction using II and Λ-AX+ shows that
P
+
Λ 6 ⊢∆n →֒ ∀x1 . . .∀xn(ϕ
∗
→ψ∗) for all n, and hence
P
+
Λ 6 ⊢∆∞ →֒ ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ
∗
→ψ∗). Let k∗ be the largest
k such that Distk ∈ ∆∞ (where take k∗ = ∞ if, for all k,
Distk ∈ ∆∞). Intuitively, k∗ will be the size of the domain
in the PS structure that we construct.
By REN, I can assume without loss of generality that
x1, . . . , xn do not appear in ∆∞. Thus, from F3+, it fol-
lows that P+Λ 6 ⊢∆∞ →֒ ϕ→ψ. A formula is a (complete)
equality statement for x1, . . . , xn if it is a conjunction of
formulas of the form xi = xj and xi 6= xj , such that for all
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n, either xi = xj or xi 6= xj is a conjunct.
Note that a complete equality statement is interpretation-
independent, and some equality statement must be true of
every valuation. It thus follows (using II and Λ-AX+), that
P
+
Λ 6 ⊢∆∞ ∪ {σ} →֒ ϕ→ψ, for some equality statement σ.
An equality statement σ partitions x1, . . . , xn into equiva-
lence classes, where it follows from σ that all the variables in
each equivalence class are equal to each other, but variables
in two different equivalence classes are not equal to each
other. Suppose that there are h equivalence classes. Clearly
h ≤ k∗ (for otherwise σ would be inconsistent with distk∗ ∈
∆∞, so it would follow that P+Λ ⊢ ∆∞ ∪ {σ} →֒ ϕ→ψ).
Without loss of generality, I can assume that x1, . . . , xh are
in distinct equivalence classes (so that σ implies that, for
all j, x1 = xj ∨ . . . ∨ xh = xj ). Let ϕ′ and ψ′ be the
result of replacing xj for j > h by xi for i ≤ h, where
σ ⇒ xi = xj . It easily follows, using LLE+ and RW+, that
P
+
Λ 6 ⊢∆∞ ∪ {σ} →֒ ϕ
′
→ψ′. Let yi, 1 ≤ i < k∗ + 1 − h
be fresh variables (where k∗ + 1 − h = ∞ if k∗ = ∞)
that do not appear in ∆, ϕ′, or ψ′. Let ∆0∞ = ∆∞ ∪ {σ};
if m > 0, let ∆m∞ = ∆m−1∞ ∪ {(∧1≤j<mym 6= yj ∧
(∧1≤j≤hym 6= xj)}. Let ∆† = ∪i<k∗+1−h∆i∞. I claim
that P+Λ 6 ⊢∆† →֒ ϕ′→ψ′. To show this, since proofs are
finite, it suffices to show that P+Λ 6 ⊢∆m∞ →֒ ϕ′→ψ′ for
all m < k∗ + 1 − h. I do this by induction on m. For
m = 0, this is true by assumption. Suppose, by way of con-
tradiction, that P+Λ ⊢ ∆m∞ →֒ ϕ′→ψ′. For m > 0, note
that ∆m∞ has the form ∆∞ ∪ {σ0, σ1, . . . , σm}, where ym
appears only in σm. It thus follows from EQ that P+Λ ⊢
∆m∞ ∪ {σ
0, . . . , σm−1, ∃ymσm} →֒ ϕ′→ψ′. It is easy to
see that Distm ⇒ ∃ymσm is valid. Since Distm ∈ ∆∞,
it follows that P+Λ ⊢ ∆m−1∞ →֒ ϕ′→ψ′, contradicting the
inductive hypothesis.
Let D = {di : 1 ≤ i < k∗ + 1} consist of fresh
constant symbols not in T ∪ {c1, . . . , cn}. Let an instan-
tiation of ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ′→ψ′) be a formula in Ł−C of the
form ϕ′′→ψ′′ that results by replacing each free variable
in ϕ′→ψ′ by some element of D. For example, the in-
stantiations of ∀x∀y(P (x, y)→Q(y)) are all formulas the
form P (di,dj)→Q(dj). Let ∆∗ be the result of replacing
each formula ∀x1 . . . ∀xn(ϕ′→ψ′) in ∆ by all its instantia-
tions, and replacing the free variables x1, . . . , xh, y1, y2, . . .
in the formulas in ∆† − ∆ by d1,d2, . . . respectively. Let
ϕ∗ and ψ∗ be the result of replacing x1, . . . , xh in ϕ′ and ψ′
by d1, . . . ,dh, respectively. I claim that PΛ∪∆∗
0
6 ⊢∆∗→ →֒
ϕ∗→ψ∗. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that PΛ∪∆∗
0
⊢
∆∗→ →֒ ϕ
∗
→ψ∗. Then clearly P+Λ ⊢ ∆∗ →֒ ϕ∗→ψ∗. Let
∆1 be the result of replacing all occurrences of d1,d2, . . .
by x1, . . . , xh, y1, y2, . . ., respectively. Then P+Λ ⊢ ∆1 →֒
ϕ′→ψ′ (simply replace the constants dj by the appropriate
variables in each line of the derivation of ϕ∗→ψ∗). More-
over, ∆1 has the form ∆2 ∪ (∆† − ∆), and, by F1+ and
Λ-AX+, it easily follows that ∆ ∪ (∆† − ∆) →֒ ϕ′→ψ’;
that is, ∆† →֒ ϕ′→ψ′. This gives us the desired contradic-
tion.
Since PΛ∪∆∗
0
6 ⊢∆∗→ →֒ ϕ
∗
→ψ∗, it follows by Theo-
rem 3.3 that there exists a PS structure M ∈ PS(Λ) and
a valuation V such that M |= ∆∗ and M |= ϕ∗→ψ∗.
Moreover, by standard arguments (used, for example, in
(Friedman, Halpern, & Koller 2000)) the domain of M can
be taken to be countable. Since Distk ∈ ∆∗ for all k < k∗,
and if k∗ < ∞, ¬Distk∗ ∈ ∆∗, all the worlds in M mus+t
have domain size k∗ (where, if k∗ = ∞, the domain is
countable). Hence, I can assume without loss of general-
ity that all the worlds have the same domain, which can be
take to be D = {di : i < k∗}; moreover, di can be taken
to be the interpretation di in each domain. It follows that
M |= ∆, and M 6 |=ϕ→ψ, as desired.
3.2 Quantitative Reasoning
The super-polynomial semantics just talks about asymptotic
complexity. It says that for any polynomial p, the conclusion
will hold with probability greater than 1 − 1/p(n) for suffi-
ciently large n, provided that the assumptions hold with suf-
ficiently high probability, where n can be, for example, the
security parameter. While this asymptotic complexity cer-
tainly gives insight into the security of a protocol, in prac-
tice, a system designer wants to achieve a certain level of
security, and needs to know, for example, how large to take
the keys in order to achieve this. In this section, I provide a
more quantitative semantics appropriate for such reasoning,
and connect the qualitative and quantitative semantics.
The syntax of the quantitative language, which is denoted
ŁC,q, is just like that of the qualitative language, except that,
instead of formulas of the form ϕ→ψ, there are formulas
of the form ϕ→rψ, where r is a real number in [0, 1]. The
semantics of such a formula is straightforward:
(M,V ) |= ϕ→rψ if there exists some n∗ ≥ 0 such that
for all n ≥ n∗, Prn([[ψ]]M,V | [[ϕ]]M,V ) ≥ 1− r).
I define Ł0C,q in the obvious way.
For each of the axioms and rules in system PΛ, there is a
corresponding sound axiom or rule in Ł0C,q:
LLEq . If ⊢Λ∪∆fo ϕ1 ⇔ ϕ2, then from ∆ →֒ ϕ1→rψ infer
∆ →֒ ϕ2→rψ.
RWq . If ⊢Λ∪∆fo ψ1 ⇒ ψ2, then from ∆ →֒ ϕ→rψ1 infer
∆ →֒ ϕ→rψ2.
REFq . ϕ→0ϕ (reflexivity).
ANDq. From ϕ→r1ψ1 and ϕ→r2ψ2 infer ϕ→r3ψ1 ∧ ψ2,
where r3 = min(r1 + r2, 1).
ORq. From ϕ1→r1ψ and ϕ→r2ψ2 infer ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2→r3ψ,
where r3 = max(2r1, 2r2, 1).
CMq . From ϕ1→r1ϕ2 and ϕ1→r2ψ infer ϕ ∧ ϕ2→r3ψ,
where r3 = max(r1 + r2, 1).
Let P+,qΛ denote this set of rules, together with F1+, F3+,
EQ, REN, and II (all of which hold with no change in the
quantitative setting), and
INC. If r1 ≤ r2, then from ϕ→r1ψ infer ϕ→r2ψ.
Theorem 3.6: The rules in P+,qΛ are all sound.
Proof: The soundness of the quantitative analogues of the
rules in PΛ is immediate from the proof of Theorem 3.2.
The soundness of remaining rules holds as it did before
(since they are unchanged). PS structure
I do not believe that P+,qΛ is complete, nor do I have a
candidate complete axiomatization for the quantitative lan-
guage. Nevertheless, as the proofs in (Datta et al. 2008)
show, P+,qΛ suffices for proving many results of interest in
security. Moreover, as I now show, there is a deep relation-
ship between P+Λ and P
+,q
Λ . To make it precise, given a
set of formulas ∆ ⊆ Ł0C , say that ∆′ ⊆ Ł0C,q is a quanti-
tative instantiation of ∆ if, for every formula ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆,
there is a bijection f from ∆ to ∆′ such that, for every for-
mula ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆, there is a real number r ∈ [0, 1] such that
f(ϕ→ψ) = ϕ→rψ. That is, ∆′ is a quantitative instantia-
tion of ∆ if each qualitative formula in ∆ has a quantitative
analogue in ∆′.
Although the proof of the following theorem is straight-
forward, it shows the power of using of P+Λ . Specifically, it
shows The following theorem shows that if ϕ→ψ is deriv-
able from ∆ in P+Λ then, for all r ∈ [0, 1], there exists a
quantitative instantiation ∆′ of ∆ such that ϕ→rψ is deriv-
able from ∆′ in P+,qΛ . Thus, if the system designer wants
security at level r (that is, she wants to know that the desired
security property holds with probability at least 1− r), then
if she has a qualitative proof of the result, she can compute
the strength with which her assumptions must hold in order
for the desired conclusion to hold. For example, she can
compute how to set the security parameters in order to get
the desired level of security. This result can be viewed as
justifying qualitative reasoning. Roughly speaking, it says
that it is safe to avoid thinking about the quantitative details,
since they can always be derived later. Note that this re-
sult would not hold if the language allowed negation. For
example, even if ¬(ϕ→ψ) could be proved given some as-
sumptions (using the axiom system AXΛC ), it would not nec-
essarily follow that ¬(ϕ→qψ) holds, even if the probability
of the assumptions was taken arbitrarily close to one.
Theorem 3.7: If P+Λ ⊢ ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ, then for all r ∈ [0, 1],
there exists a quantitative instantiation ∆′ of ∆ such that
P
+,q
Λ ⊢ ∆
′ →֒ ϕ→qψ. Moreover, ∆′ can be found in poly-
nomial time, given the derivation of ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ.
Proof: The existence of ∆′ follows by a straightforward in-
duction on the length of the derivation. If it has length 1,
then either ϕ = ψ, in which case it is an instance of REFq ,
or ϕ→ψ ∈ ∆, in which case I simply take ∆′ such that it
includes ϕ→rψ. For the inductive step, the only nontrivial
case is if ϕ→ψ follows from earlier steps by an instance of
a rule of inference in P+Λ . The result then follows by a sim-
ple case analysis on the form of the rule. For example, if the
AND rule is used, then ϕ→ψ has the form ϕ→ψ1 ∧ ψ2,
and there are shorter derivations of ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ1 and
∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ2. Choose s1, s2 ∈ [0, 1] such that s1+s2 = r2
2It suffices to take s1 = s2 = r/2, but there is an advantage to
having this greater flexibility; see the discussion after the proof.
By the induction hypothesis, there exist variants ∆1 and
∆2 such that P+,qΛ ⊢ ∆i →֒ ϕ→siψi, for i = 1, 2.
Let ∆3 be a quantitative instantiation of ∆ that dominates
both ∆1 and ∆2, in the sense that if ϕ′→riψ′ ∈ ∆i, for
i = 1, 2, 3, then ri ≥ max(r1, r2). Then it is easy to see
that P+,qΛ ⊢ ∆3 →֒ ϕ→siψi for i = 1, 2. By ANDq , it
easily follows that P+,qΛ ∆3 →֒ ϕ→rψ1∧ψ2. The argument
for all the other rules in P+Λ is similar. This argument also
shows that finding ∆′ from the proof of ∆ →֒ ϕ→ψ just
involves solving some simple linear inequalities, which can
be done in polynomial time.
The proof of Theorem 3.7 gives even more useful infor-
mation to the system designer. In general, there may be a
number of quantitative instantiations ∆′ of ∆ that give the
desired conclusion. For example, as the proof shows, if the
AND rule is used in the qualitative proof, and we want the
conclusion to hold at level r, we must just choose s1 and
s2 such that ϕ→ψ1 and ϕ→ψ2 hold at level s1 and s2, re-
spectively. If the system designer finds it easier to satisfy
the first formula than the second (for example, the first may
involve the length of the key, while the second may involve
the degree of trustworthiness of one of the participants in
the protocol), there may be an advantage in choosing s1 rel-
atively small and s2 larger. As long as s1 + s2 = r, the
desired conclusion will hold.
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